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Vol. 89, No. 16, Friday, April 20, 2007
City of Portland Measure 26-91
AMENDS CHARTER: CHANGES FORM OF
CITY GOVERNMENT
The Portland City Council has referred four proposed charter amendments to the May 15,
2007 ballot. One of them, Measure 26-91, proposes to amend the city charter to replace
the present commission form of government with one headed by a mayor with increased
executive authority and a strengthened chief administrative officer. City commissioners
would lose all direct responsibility for, and authority over, bureau operations and would
perform purely legislative duties.
Your committee concludes that, while the proposed change in form of government would
likely promote greater efficiency in city government, the changes would also jeopardize
the innovation and resiliency that benefit Portland under the current form. By granting
considerable authority to each commissioner, the current form attracts strong leaders to
run for City Council and offers commissioners real opportunities to implement innovative
policies and projects through their assigned bureaus. Furthermore, by spreading authority
broadly among commissioners, the current form not only offers citizens greater access to
city leaders, it ensures that diffuse leadership can serve as a bulwark against an ineffectual
or reckless mayor. Your committee recommends that Portland voters not risk losing those
advantages.
Your committee believes that each form of city government has inherent advantages
and disadvantages, and that substituting one form of government for another may cause
unintended negative consequences. This risk analysis is particularly meaningful when
considering the present proposal, where the proponents have not made a strong case
that change is either necessary or beneficial. Further, your committee believes that the
mayor and City Council can and must cooperate to make Portland’s commission form of
government operate more effectively, while preserving the resiliency and creativity that is
possible with our current form of government.
City Club and the greater Portland community may want to reconsider this issue in
the future, but at this time, your committee is convinced that the proposed change is
unwarranted.
Your committee unanimously recommends a "No" vote on Measure 26-91.
City Club members will vote on this report on Friday, April 20, 2007. Until the membership
vote takes place, City Club of Portland does not have an official position on this report.
The outcome of this vote will be reported in the City Club Bulletin dated May 4, 2007 and
online at www.pdxcityclub.org .
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INTRODUCTION
Ballot Measure 26-91 will appear on the ballot as follows:
Caption: Changes form of City government
Question: Shall executive authority be transferred from Commissioners to the Mayor,
and Council exercise legislative and quasi-judicial duties?
Summary: The measure changes the structure of city government adopted in
1 913. City Council members and Mayor currently share all executive, legislative,
quasi-judicial and administrative functions. This measure distributes executive and
administrative functions to Mayor and legislative and quasi-judicial functions to
Council. The Mayor remains a voting member of Council, but does not have veto
power. The Mayor prepares the budget, distributes work among offices, hires and
discharges most employees, subject to civil service. Council adopts the budget
and strategic plans, and exercises legislative oversight through investigations and
hearings. The measure authorizes Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) to manage and
coordinate city operations, administration and personnel, under supervision of the
Mayor. The Mayor hires the CAO, subject to Council confirmation. The Mayor may
fire the CAO. Bureau directors are currently hired by individual Commissioners. The
measure transfers responsibility for performance, including hiring and firing of bureau
directors, to the Mayor. The measure also changes the process for filling vacancies in
City elective office. This measure is effective January 1, 2009.
(The caption, question, and summary were prepared by the city attorney.)
Ballot Measure 26-91 proposes replacing Portland’s 94-year-old commission form
of government with a mayor-council form of government and a strengthened
chief administrative officer.
City Club’s Board of Governors chartered a study to review the measure and
assist Club members and the public to better understand the implications of the
proposed changes and to recommend a “yes” or a “no” vote. The eight members
of your committee were screened to ensure that no member had a conflict
of interest or had taken a public position on the subject of the measure. The
study was conducted during February and March of 2007. Committee members
interviewed proponents and opponents of the measure, members of the charter
review commission, neighborhood and business representatives, and current and
former city officials and employees. Your committee reviewed relevant articles,
written presentations and testimony, past City Club reports, and a range of other
materials.
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BACKGROUND
COMMON TYPES OF CITY
GOVERNMENT
Four distinct forms of municipal
government are commonly found in
the United States: (1) city manager-
city council; (2) mayor-city council; (3)
commission; and (4) town meeting.
According to the National League
of Cities, the predominant forms are
distributed as follows: city manager-
city council with 58 percent; mayor-city
council with 38 percent; and commission,
town meeting and other forms
combining for 4 percent. (See Appendix
A for descriptions of the three most
common types of city government.)
POwERS OF GOVERNMENT
Understanding the debate over the
proposed measure requires basic
definitions of common terms used to
describe the functions of municipal
governments: legislative authority,
executive authority, administrative
authority and quasi-judicial authority.
Legislative authority is the ultimate
power to make legislation — to create
the ordinances and policies that bind
a city. Those directives likewise bind
the executive authority, which under
Portland’s current form of government
consists of commissioners and bureau
directors responsible for specific bureaus.
Legislative authority also implicitly
includes the power of oversight — the
legislative body’s right to hold hearings
and inquire about whether ordinances
and policies are being properly
implemented.
Executive authority is the power
to implement and administer the
ordinances and policies set by the
legislative authority and to manage the
personnel and resources of a city.
Administrative authority , in the context
of this measure, refers to the day-to-day
operations of bureaus.
In a municipal setting, quasi-judicial
authority is exercised when the city
council decides land-use or other kinds
of appeals and is required to make formal
findings and conclusions, which are
guided by legal requirements.
PORTLAND'S CITY GOVERNMENT: THE
COMMISSION FORM
Under Portland’s city charter, the city is
governed by a commission made up of a
mayor and four full-time commissioners, all
elected at large in nonpartisan elections.
Portland’s government does not separate
executive and legislative functions. The
mayor and the four commissioners serve
as the legislative body — developing
policy, setting the city’s budget, and
passing ordinances. All five members of
the commission also serve as executive
heads of bureaus assigned by the mayor.
(See Appendix B for a list of current
bureau assignments.) The mayor and
commissioners hire professional managers
to run the day-to-day operations of their
bureaus and have the authority to fire both
the directors and the staff of the bureaus
assigned to them. The full City Council
also acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when
hearing land-use and other appeals.
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The mayor and the four commissioners
each have one vote and are generally
equal in rank and power. The mayor’s
additional authority includes the
assignment and reassignment of
bureaus to individual commissioners,
chairing City Council meetings, and
preparation of a proposed unified
budget for consideration by the full
council. Under the current form of
government, City Council has created the
position of chief administrative officer
to direct and coordinate the Office of
Management and Finance and provide
expert advice to the mayor, Council and
bureaus on citywide matters related
to administration, finance and budget.
Because the Office of Management
and Finance is currently under the
jurisdiction of the mayor, it is the mayor
who possesses the authority to hire and
fire the chief administrative officer.
In addition to the mayor and four
commissioners, Portland elects a
city auditor to conduct financial and
performance audits of city government.
Each of the six elected positions holds
a four-year term; the mayor and two
commissioners are elected at the
same time; the auditor and two other
commissioners are elected two years
later.
HISTORY OF PORTLAND’S FORM OF
GOVERNMENT
Following a nationwide reform
movement, Portland adopted the
commission form of government in 1913.
Before this movement, most cities were
governed by a strong mayor or a city
ward system with district-elected council
members. Many city governments
throughout the country changed
from the ward form and moved to the
commission form because of corruption
and inefficiency under the ward system.
By 1917, 500 cities were using the
commission form. The same year, as many
cities across the country began to adopt
the mayor-council or city manager-
council form, Portland voters rejected
two measures to repeal the commission
form. In 1926 and 1927, Portland voters
approved simplification and retention
of the commission form. Since 1913,
Portland has voted on measures to
change its city government seven times
and retained the commission form each
time. Of the 30 largest U.S. cities by
population, Portland is the only city that
continues to use the commission form of
government. 1
CITY CLUB POSITIONS ON
PORTLAND’S FORM OF GOVERNMENT
1933 and 1958 — Recommended City
Manager: In 1933, City Club issued a
report that recommended adoption
of the council-city manager form of
government. A similar proposal went to
the ballot as an initiative in 1958 with
City Club’s support. Voters rejected the
proposal by a margin of 53 percent to 47
percent.
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1960s — Recommended Strong Mayor:
On May 19, 1961, after over one year of
study, a City Club committee published a
report analyzing the various forms of city
government. The report concluded that
Portland’s government was weakened
by the diffusion of management to five
equal commissioners who also made
up the legislative body. The report also
stated that the legislative function
was weakened by the inherent conflict
in attending to citywide priorities
and bureau-specific administrative
responsibilities.
Study committee members unanimously
recommended that Portland adopt
a strong mayor-council form of
government with a legislative city council
of eight members elected at large. The
report was overwhelmingly adopted by
the City Club membership.
Following the Club’s adoption of the
1961 report, a City Club sub-committee
was charged with drafting a proposed
new city charter, based on the report’s
recommendations. That subcommittee
proposed a revised city charter on July
5, 1963, which was approved by the Club
membership.
2
 Thereafter, a coalition of
civic and political groups obtained the
necessary signatures to put a measure
substantially similar to the one proposed
by City Club on the May 1966 ballot. The
Club issued a report recommending a
“yes” vote on the measure, which City
Club members adopted by a margin of
eight to one. The citizens of Portland
rejected the measure by a margin of
nearly two to one.
2002 — Recommended Retaining
Commission Form, Further Study:
Measure 26-30 was placed on the May
21, 2002 ballot by citizen initiative
and proposed changing Portland’s
government from the commission form
to the mayor-council form. The measure
proposed giving the mayor all executive
and administrative authority and the
Council all legislative and quasi-judicial
authority. The Council would have been
increased to nine members — two
elected at large and seven elected from
geographically defined districts. The
mayor would have been given veto
power, subject to Council override.
On May 3, 2002, City Club published a
64-page report on Measure 26-30. The
majority of the committee recommended
adoption of the measure, claiming
efforts to patch the commission form
and coordinate the city’s administrative
functions had failed. The report
concluded Measure 26-30 would remove
structural barriers that increased costs
and disenfranchised citizens. The majority
concluded that consolidating executive
power under the mayor would improve
government efficiency and a purely
legislative City Council would increase
effectiveness and access to government.
However, a minority of the committee
opposed Measure 26-30. The minority
report acknowledged that city
government could improve, but
recommended an extensive analysis
of the problems and an examination
of alternative solutions rather than
an immediate change in structure.
The minority argued that, at that
time, no one knew whether Portland’s
accomplishments since 1961 had
come about because of the form of
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government or in spite of it. The minority
recommended that the city create a
charter review commission to determine
whether charter changes were warranted.
In a controversial vote, City Club
members adopted the minority report,
calling for a “no” vote on the measure.
Portland voters rejected Measure 26-30
by a wide margin.
MAIOR ELEMENTS OF MEASURE 26-91
If passed, Measure 26-91 would
eliminate the current commission form
of government and institute a mayor-
council form of government, with a
strengthened chief administrative
officer. Under the proposal, the role of
the city’s chief administrative officer
would be expanded to oversee and
coordinate management of the city’s
bureaus, operations and finances — a
role currently performed by City Council.
The chief administrative officer would
be appointed by the mayor, subject
to confirmation by City Council, and
would be accountable to the mayor.
The mayor would be the city’s chief
elected executive official, with ultimate
authority and political accountability for
city operations and would possess the
authority to fire most city employees.
City Council members would focus on
legislative oversight of city operations
and management, policy development,
long-term strategic planning and
constituent representation. Key changes
would include the following:
Mayor
• would have executive authority over
all city bureaus
• would continue as a voting member
of City Council
• would not have veto power
• would be required to appoint a
qualified chief administrative officer
and bureau directors, subject to
confirmation by City Council
• would have sole authority to fire the
chief administrative officer
• would have authority to fire all city
employees except for personal staff
of elected officials and limited other
officials
City Council
• would consist of the mayor and four
council members elected at large
• would exercise comprehensive
legislative authority through
ordinances and resolutions
• would conduct oversight of the
management of city affairs by the
mayor and chief administrative
officer to ensure efficient, effective
and equitable delivery of services
(for example, by implementation
of oversight committees on which
citizens may serve)
• would develop and articulate the
city’s policies, goals and long-term
strategic plan
• would approve and adopt the city’s
budget
• would confirm appointments of
chief administrative officer, bureau
directors and Council-created boards
and commissions
• would appoint and remove the city
attorney
• would provide constituent services
and avenues for constituents to voice
opinions and concerns
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Chief Administrative Officer
• would be appointed by the mayor,
subject to confirmation by City
Council
• would report to and be accountable
to the mayor and would be subject
to removal by the mayor
• would direct and coordinate day-to-
day operations and administration
of all bureaus
• would recommend qualified
nominees to the mayor to fill bureau
director vacancies
• would appoint, direct and discharge
all city employees other than bureau
directors, the personal staff of
elected officials and other officials
whose appointment is otherwise
provided for in the city charter
• would prepare budget for
submission to the mayor and
would be responsible for the
administration of the adopted
budget
Transition
No transition plan has been developed.
There has been no detailed analysis of
the transition costs nor has there been
a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed
changes.
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PROPONENTS’ AND OPPONENTS’ ASSERTIONS
MAjOR ASSERTIONS MADE IN FAVOR
OF CHANGING PORTLAND'S FORM OF
GOVERNMENT
Strategic Direction
• Portland has outgrown its antiquated
commission form of government.
All other major cities in the U.S.
abandoned this form long ago. Portland
needs a government that can meet
complex future challenges, such as
population growth, declining state
and federal subsidies, and an aging
infrastructure.
• The commission form encourages
commissioners to protect their own
bureaus at the expense of broader
citywide initiatives. Commissioners
too often protect the budgets and
interests of their assigned bureaus to
the detriment of the overall interests
of the city. The proposed form would
encourage council members to
adopt a comprehensive view of city
administration that cuts across bureaus.
• Under the proposed form, city council
members would be able to devote more
of their time to legislation and strategic
planning.
• The mayor and chief administrative
officer would be in touch with all aspects
of government and would have a better
chance of avoiding overlapping projects
and problems that take them by surprise,
such as Columbia Sportswear’s decision
to move outside Portland’s city limits.
• The proposed form would allow the
mayor to set priorities for the city without
being distracted by second tier projects
advanced by commissioners. Currently,
too many projects are driven by
the particular interests of individual
commissioners rather than a rational
assessment of citywide needs.
Delivery of Services and Representation
• Turf battles between commissioners
and between bureau heads significantly
reduce coordination and efficiency
(i.e., the “silo effect”). Each bureau has
its own culture, dependent upon
its commissioner and bureau head.
Redundancies (e.g., overlapping
computer systems and multiple
emergency operations centers) and a
lack of adequate long-range planning
cause inefficiencies that have a high
cost to the city and taxpayers. A mayor
and chief administrative officer with
greater authority would result in
greater coordination among bureaus
and more effective and efficient
delivery of city services.
• People think the mayor is in charge of
the city now; the measure would align
perceptions with reality.
• The current form of government exposes
bureau heads and other city employees
to the vagaries of electoral politics and
to supervision by commissioners with
little or no management experience.
The proposed form would insulate
bureau heads and other city employees
from political pressure, making it
more likely that the city could recruit,
hire and retain the best professional
management and staff. It would also
make it more likely that city employees
could do their jobs without the
influence of politically motivated or
incompetent commissioners.
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• Under the current form of government,
commissioners tend to abdicate their
oversight responsibilities.  Commissioners
tend to defer to the commissioner in
charge of a particular bureau in order
to prevent criticism of their bureaus by
fellow commissioners.
• Cost overruns for the aerial tram and
problems with the water bureau billing
system resulted from decentralized
management of city services under the
commission system.
• The proposed change would create clear
lines of administrative and political
accountability for operation of bureaus
through the chief administrative officer to
the mayor.
• City council members would be more
available to help citizens gain better
access and service from city government.
Under the new form, members of City
Council would have more time to visit
neighborhoods and to help citizens
gain better access and service from city
government.
Process
• The proposed change resulted from a
lengthy, open and deliberative process
facilitated by a citizen-led charter review
commission. The commission consisted
of a diverse group of 26 Portlanders
advised by an 11-member honorary
advisory committee. The commission
conducted more than 70 regular and
subcommittee public meetings and
participated in more than 30 community
outreach meetings over 14 months.
The commission also researched
national and local best practices and
interviewed more than 50 individuals.
The recommendations were approved
by a majority of commission members.
MAjOR ASSERTIONS MADE AGAINST
CHANGING PORTLAND'S FORM OF
GOVERNMENT
Strategic Direction
• Portland is a highly successful city —
whatever problems exist do not justify a
drastic change in Portland’s government.
Portland is consistently ranked one of
the most livable cities in the nation and
currently enjoys a AAA bond rating.
Portland is known across the nation for
its many model projects, programs and
policies.
• Increasing the power of the mayor is
unnecessary. Under the current form
of government, Portland’s mayor
possesses the authority to do what
he or she wants as long as two other
commissioners agree. A good mayor —
with a good idea — can easily obtain
two additional votes.
• The proposed change concentrates too
much power in the hands of the mayor.
Under the proposed form, a mayor
might push through bad decisions.
The proposed form creates greater
opportunities for abuse of power.
• The commission form allows the city to
survive a weak or reckless mayor. Under
the commission form, four strong
commissioners with authority over
various bureaus can compensate for a
mayor who lacks genuine leadership
skills or vision for the city.
• The commission form tolerates more
internal dissent and debate than a
mayor-council form. A system that
tolerates internal dissent is more
likely to result in well thought-out
decisions. Real policy differences
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are aired publicly in the commission
form, allowing the commissioners
to understand the full range of city
operations before setting policy.
• The proposed change will not guarantee
better coordination or efficiency. Many
cities operating under a strong mayor
system, such as Seattle, have significant
problems with coordination and
efficiency.
Delivery of Services and Representation
• Portland’s commission form of
government encourages innovation by
City Council. Commissioners have the
ability — through executive control
of their bureaus — to take the lead
in developing and implementing
innovative projects (e.g., Portland
Streetcar, the green building initiative
and a vibrant system of parks). Under
a mayor-council form, only projects
of interest to the mayor would be
pursued.
• Improvements in coordination and
efficiency in city government are already
taking effect.
• Portland’s commissioners are very
responsive and directly accountable.
If a citizen has a problem with a city
service, it is easy to determine which
commissioner to approach; and the
commissioner in charge has the power
and political incentive to address the
problem. Under the proposed form,
accountability would erode — a mayor
and chief administrative officer could
not realistically be responsive and
accountable for every city bureau.
• A mayor and chief administrative
officer with more authority would not
necessarily have prevented the tram
and water bureau billing cost overruns.
Many cities under the mayor-council
form experience problems with cost
overruns and poorly selected or
executed systems.
• Legislation is best created by those
who would be implementing it.
Commissioners are able to make
relevant policy and advocate for critical
city needs because they have a detailed
understanding of bureau operations
and objectives.
• By taking away the commissioners’
executive functions, few talented or
entrepreneurial people would choose
to run for City Council. The current
commission form attracts active,
engaged, and talented citizens to run
for office because commissioners have
real authority to promote an agenda
and create change.
• Opportunities for citizen engagement
are currently very strong. A stronger
mayor system would insulate bureaus
from citizens, increase the layers of
bureaucracy, and reduce the openness
and accessibility of government
in Portland. Currently, citizens and
community groups have access to City
Hall.
Process
• The charter review commission’s report
does not articulate any major problems
with the current form of government, nor
does it attempt to connect the proposed
changes with improved city services.
• The cost of the proposed changes have
not been determined. There has been
neither a cost analysis of the transition
process nor a cost-benefit analysis of
the proposed change itself.
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“ In this instance, the proponents of the
measure must demonstrate not only that the
current commission form creates significant
problems but also that the option the charter
review commission and City Council selected
— the mayor-council form with a strengthened
chief administrative officer — is the best
method by which to solve those problems. PP
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
FRAMEwORK FOR ANALYSIS
The obvious question when discussing
the choice presented by Measure 26-91
is: Will the proposed form of government
improve aspects of city government that
function badly, while retaining those
that function well? The latter part of
this question is crucial, as Portland is a
top-tier city by many measures, often
ranking high on the lists of most livable
cities, best bicycling cities, most walkable
cities and cleanest cities. The proponents
of Measure 26-91 acknowledge this,
yet they claim Portland
has become the city
it is despite — rather
than because of — the
commission form of
government. Opponents
of the measure argue that
Portland risks losing part
of what has made it great
by taking drastic steps to
fix something that is not
broken.
Proponents of Ballot
Measure 26-91 face a
significant challenge.
In your committee’s opinion, the
proponents have the burden of proof.
Portland voters have rejected proposed
changes to their form of government
seven times. In this instance, the
proponents of the measure must
demonstrate not only that the current
commission form creates significant
problems but also that the option the
charter review commission selected
— the mayor-council form with a
strengthened chief administrative
officer — is the best method by which
to solve those problems. The onus is
on the proponents to present a clear
and compelling case that: (1) there are
problems with the current government;
(2) these problems are attributable to
the form of government; and (3) Measure
26-91 offers the best solution to the
identified problems without sacrificing
the positive attributes of the present
form.
CONCRETE EXAMPLES OFFERED BY
PROPONENTS
In attempting to answer the question
above, your committee asked nearly
every witness it interviewed to give
concrete examples of problems that
have been caused by Portland's present
form of government and how things
might be different under the proposed
form. Following his 2007 State of the
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City speech, a City Club board member
asked Mayor Potter to comment on what
would have been different under his
administration if the proposed charter
reform had been in effect. In response,
Mayor Potter did not provide even
one concrete example of what might
have been different in Portland had the
proposed form of government been in
effect.
When asked a similar question by your
committee, Mayor Potter focused on the
existence of eight emergency operations
centers within city bureaus. He stated
they are redundant and difficult to
coordinate. Mayor Potter also argued
that, under the proposed form, he would
have the authority to consolidate and
eliminate these and other redundancies.
That argument suffers from two
fundamental flaws. First, regardless of
the form of government, any change to
the emergency operations centers would
have to be approved by Council. Second,
Mayor Potter has not yet proposed any
such change to his fellow commissioners,
so it is impossible to say that the
commissioners would oppose any such
change.
In other words, a restructuring of the
emergency operations centers could
happen under the current form as
easily as it could be achieved under the
proposed form. Mayor Potter does not
point to specific hurdles presented by the
form of government that have prevented
him from consolidating the centers, nor
does he indicate that he has tried to
consolidate them — and been thwarted
— under the present form. *
Your committee concludes that the
existence of eight emergency operations
centers is not linked to the current
form of government. If there is a good
reason to restructure the emergency
response system, the mayor or any other
commissioner needs simply to make a
proposal and convince two other others
to support it — the same process that
would be required under the proposed
form of government.
Considering Mayor Potter’s other
examples, and the examples cited
by other proponents, there was no
compelling evidence that the problems
they raised were caused by the form of
government, or that the problems would
not have occurred under the proposed
form of government. Other examples
cited by proponents include:
Columbia Sportswear leaving
Northeast Portland for neighboring
Washington County: In 2001, in what
was often described as a “surprise”
move, Columbia Sportswear moved
its headquarters from Portland to
Washington County. In the intervening
years, there have been barbed
accusations directed back and forth
about whether the city of Portland was
to blame for the loss. Nonetheless, when
asked directly, there was near unanimity
* Mayor Potter currently controls the emergency response system. The Web site for the Office of
Emergency Management, states: “The Portland Office of Emergency Management (POEM, created in FY
2003-04) centralizes leadership and coordination responsibilities for emergency management into a single
organization under the direction of the Mayor.”
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from witnesses, both proponents and
opponents, that Columbia Sportswear
leaving Portland had nothing to do with
the form of government.
Water bureau billing software
problem: In 2000, the city installed a
new software program to bill customers
for water and sewer use. Problems with
the installation or implementation of the
new software caused there to be millions
of dollars in billing errors. Proponents
of the proposed form of government
invoked this problem as evidence that
Portland is compromised by its form of
government. That analysis, however, is not
compelling, because no witness was able
to identify any way in which the form of
government caused or contributed to the
problem. Indeed, the city auditor, Gary
Blackmer, whose job includes evaluating
problems that arise, noted that every city
has these kinds of problems, regardless of
the form of government.
Aerial tram cost overruns: The city
of Portland, through the Portland
Development Commission, was a public
partner in the largely private venture of
building an aerial tram that connects the
new South Waterfront neighborhood
to the main campus of Oregon Health
Sciences University on Marquam
Hill. Costs of the project significantly
exceeded original projections, and in
the end cost approximately $57 million
dollars. The city’s share of this was $8.5
million. Some proponents suggested
that the cost overruns were attributable
to a failure of the present form of
government. Similar to the water bureau
issue, witnesses could not point to any
persuasive evidence to support that
claim. To the contrary, witnesses stated
“
That analysis, however, is not
compelling, because no witness
was able to identify any way in
which the form of government
caused or contributed to the
problem. Indeed, the city auditor,
Gary Blackmer, whose job
includes evaluating problems
that arise, noted that every city
has these kinds of problems,
regardless of the form of
government.
that the cost overruns were a function
of genuine construction issues ( e.g. ,
skyrocketing steel prices and changes
in design) and of failures of the specific
individuals involved.
Near-sale of Mt. Tabor property
to Warner Pacific College:  In 2006,
representatives of Portland Parks and
Recreation signed a memorandum of
understanding to sell a piece of city
property on Mt. Tabor to Warner Pacific
College. Commissioner Randy Leonard
opposed the transaction and asserted
that the property was owned by the
water bureau rather than the parks
bureau. After the proposed transaction
came to the public’s attention, it stalled.
Both proponents and opponents used
this example to help demonstrate their
views about the form of government.
Proponents of the measure argued that
under the new form of government,
there never would have been confusion
about which bureau had control over the
sale of property and that Council would
have set the procedures for the sale of
PP
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city property. Opponents argued that,
under the proposed form of government,
the mayor could have sold the property
outright without adequate input
from the public or from other Council
members. Because Council can — and
almost surely would — limit the mayor’s
authority to sell significant amounts of
city-owned property under either form of
government, your committee concludes
that the near-sale of Mt. Tabor property is
not a convincing example for either side
of the debate.
Burnside-Couch couplet:  For years there
has been discussion about changing West
Burnside into a one-way street, re-routing
traffic moving the opposite direction
to Northwest Couch Street. As the Pearl
District’s development along Northwest
Couch has blossomed, opposition to
this change has grown. A March 2007
editorial in The Oregonian argued both
that the couplet had not been thought
through and that the commission form of
government was to blame. The testimony
presented to your committee was
contrary to the opinion of The Oregonian ’s
editorial board. The proposed changes to
Burnside and Couch streets have been
part of an overall transportation plan for
decades, and nothing about the form of
government had any effect on that plan
or on the recent dispute about whether
the plan is a good idea. In the end, these
types of decisions are policy decisions,
which would be decided by a Council
vote under either form of government.
City Club of Portland
Long-Range Planning 
Your committee heard many witnesses
on both sides of the debate express
a desire for citywide long-range
planning. Proponents of the measure
argue the absence of a comprehensive
citywide plan during the last twenty
years demonstrates a weakness of the
commission form of government. Your
committee is not convinced by this
argument and believes it to be a red
herring. The process for approval of a
strategic plan must be distinguished
from implementation of such a plan.
The process for approval is the same
under either form of government — it
requires the agreement of a majority of
the entire City Council. Your committee
believes that only the latter aspect —the
implementation of a strategic plan — is
related to the form of government.
Nearly all witnesses agreed there is
nothing inherent in the commission
form of government that prevents a
strong leader — including the mayor
— from spurring Council to develop a
comprehensive long-term strategic plan
for the city. Portland’s history is reflective
of this point. A number of past mayors
have been successful at planning within
this form of government. Under the
current form, a mayor needs only two
additional votes to promote an agenda
that considers all aspects of the city’s
responsibilities and broadly addresses
the needs of its citizens. Under either
form of government, strategic planning
relies upon the City Council as a whole.
“
 Nearly all witnesses agreed
there is nothing inherent in the
commission form of government
that directly prevents a strong
leader — including the mayor —
from spurring Council to develop
a comprehensive long-term
strategic plan for the city.
Your committee agrees with the
proponents that it would be easier
under the proposed form of government
for a mayor to unilaterally implement
projects that are consistent with his
or her strategic vision because City
Council members would have no
authority to interfere with the mayor’s
implementation. However, your
committee believes that by involving the
entire Council in implementation, as well
as planning, the current form provides
better checks and balances against a
mayor who might try to implement
flawed policies.
Your committee is persuaded that under
the current form of government a mayor,
exercising leadership, and commissioners,
engaged as cooperative participants, are
capable of creating and implementing a
citywide strategic plan if they make it a
priority.
Budgeting 
Your committee is persuaded that, under
the commission form of government, the
commissioners are inclined to protect
the budgets of the bureaus for which
they have responsibility and also are






other bureaus in a quid pro quo effort
to shield their own budgets from heavy
scrutiny. The proponents of Measure 26-
91 argue that a council with no bureau
responsibilities would exercise its budget
oversight responsibility more diligently.
Your committee agrees that, under the
proposed form of government, council
members would not have the same
incentive to protect individual bureau
budgets. However, your committee
also believes that the loss of detailed
knowledge about a particular bureau’s
operations would be detrimental to
the budgeting process. Commissioners
who have a close working knowledge of
bureau operations know which sections
of the budget are most sensitive to cuts
and can effectively advocate for retaining
funds for crucial services or projects
when funds are scarce. They also can
identify more effectively areas where
additional funds would have the greatest
impact when revenues increase.
Tools are available under the current
form that are intended to prevent
commissioners from guarding their
own bureaus’ budgets at the expense
of overall city priorities. Under the
commission form, a mayor who wishes to
pursue a collective vision for the city may
champion that agenda. Using the budget
process over which the mayor has
initial control, the mayor could require a
robust debate among all commissioners
creating a vision beyond the next fiscal
year, such as a five-year plan. Moreover,
the commissioners have addressed
this issue recently by instituting a
policy requiring each commissioner to
present his or her bureaus’ budgets to
two other commissioners for review
and modification before presenting
the budget to the mayor’s office. Your
committee has concluded that these
protections mitigate the concerns the
proponents seek to address by changing
Portland's form of government.
Delivery of Services and
Representation
Coordination Among Bureaus 
Proponents of the measure argue that
city bureaus are isolated from one
another and suffer from a profound lack
of coordination because of the current
form of government. Your committee is
persuaded that the city should improve
communication and coordination among
the bureaus. However, some witnesses
familiar with a strong mayor form of
government stated that city bureaus
operating under a strong mayor form
also sometimes suffer from isolation and
lack of communication or, a “silo effect.”
The term “silo effect” has become a sound
bite that stifles thoughtful discussion of a
valid point.
“
 The term 'silo effect' has
become a sound bite that stifles
thoughtful discussion of a valid
point. PP
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When asked for examples of how
the commission form of government
has been detrimental to Portland,
proponents of the measure often cite
the decision by Columbia Sportswear
to leave the city without significant
consultation with the mayor. However,
your committee heard from numerous
witnesses, including two former mayors,
who did not find a connection between
Columbia Sportswear's move and the
form of city government. Most witnesses
stated the real cause was a lack of
communication between the mayor,
commissioners and bureau directors and
a lack of relationship between City Hall
and the business community. Following
Columbia Sportswear's move, Mayor
Katz instituted a Strategic Development
Opportunity Team. This inter-bureau
team was designed to bring citywide
issues to the attention of the mayor and
commissioners.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that a
change in the form of government will
ensure better inter-bureau collaboration.
In fact, several witnesses pointed to
Multnomah County as a clear example of
a strong executive government that has
not prevented silos from developing on a
departmental basis.
Your committee has concluded that
changing the form of government is
not the only method — and certainly
not the best method — available to
foster collaboration and communication
among bureaus. There are examples of
collaboration under the current form:
two recent reports on cross-bureau
planning projects, the Asset Status and
Condition Report (Dec. 2006) and the
River Renaissance Project’s State of the
River Report (Sept. 2006) document
how bureaus are working together
successfully now.
Nonetheless, while your committee
recognizes that the proposed form of
government may create incentives for
cooperation and communication that do
not exist under the current form, your
committee is willing to risk some lack
of coordination in order to preserve the
strengths of the current form.
Efficiency, Cost-Savings and Operations 
Under the commission form, the
same incentives to defer to other
commissioners during the budgeting
process leads to tacit agreements not
to inquire too deeply about other
commissioners’ bureau operations.
Your committee agrees that unified
bureau administration would create an
environment for increasing oversight,
reducing redundant services, and
promoting collaboration among
bureaus. But, there is nothing magical
about the proposed form. As with the
current form, increased efficiency and
collaboration would rely heavily upon
individual officials and employees to
pursue inter-bureau cooperation and
communication. Hence, the question: can
the mayor devise a cost-effective service
delivery system if the voters do not adopt
Measure 26-91? When directly posed
that question by your committee, Mayor
Potter answered with a qualified “yes.”
He observed that the process to achieve
that goal would be more burdensome if
he did not have all the bureaus under his
control.
19Measure 26-91
In considering this argument, your
committee is mindful that effective
changes to the city’s service delivery
systems (whether it is reducing
the number of computer software
systems or the number of emergency
operations centers) will occur only
if the mayor has Council’s support.
Further, your committee recognizes that
commissioners must run for citywide
election on the records they establish
during their terms. If the mayor presents
an agenda of streamlining services, such
as implementing uniform employee
training and retention programs,
management training, improving
public engagement procedures or
the like, commissioners who resist
those innovations in their bureaus will
ultimately have to answer to voters.
Although the proponents argue that a
change in form of government would
ultimately save taxpayers money, they
have presented no compelling evidence
to support that assertion. In fact, the
city has not determined the cost of the
proposed transition or any potential
costs or savings that might result from
the proposed change.
Proponents of Measure 26-91 claim
that commissioners often have little
management experience, or that the
present form of government allows
for election of amateur bureaucrats to
run technically complex bureaus. Your
committee does not find this argument
to be compelling because, under the
present form of government, each
bureau director is a professional manager.
Portland’s bureau directors have had
generally stable tenures, even though
the commissioners to whom they report
“
Your committee believes that
Portland is enhanced by our city
commissioners having a detailed,
working knowledge of bureaus, a
knowledge that commissioners
gain by exercising executive
authority. PP
change occasionally due to elections or
reassignments.
More importantly, as it relates to the
difference between the present and
proposed forms of government, the
present form of government allows
commissioners to develop an intricate
knowledge about how city bureaus work.
Your committee believes that Portland
is enhanced by our city commissioners
having a detailed, working knowledge
of bureaus, a knowledge that
commissioners gain by exercising
executive authority. By contrast, under
the proposed form of government,
eliminating commissioners' responsibility
for implementing legislative decisions
would generally diminish their
understanding of the needs of the
bureaus and of the city as a whole.
Even if your committee had been
persuaded that Measure 26-91 would
vastly improve efficiency in providing city
services, proponents of the measure have
not presented voters with an analysis
of new costs that might offset savings.
Indeed, while proponents frequently
have cited potential cost savings in the
millions or tens of millions of dollars,
your committee found no evidence
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to support those figures. Not much
is known about the costs of a more
centralized administration. Furthermore,
the proposed form of government
would likely add some costs in the form
of additional staffing in the offices of
the mayor and the chief administrative
officer. At least one commissioner has
also suggested that, like the Oregon
Legislature, City Council under the
proposed form of government would
require additional personnel to engage
in legislative oversight of the mayor’s
performance of executive duties.
Your committee listened carefully to
proponents’ arguments that the aerial
tram cost overruns and the water bureau
billing difficulties are indicative of a
lack of streamlined management of city
services and would not have occurred
under the proposed form of government.
However, we were persuaded that such
overruns and problems can and do
occur in cities across the United States,
irrespective of form of government, and
in the private sector as well.
Meeting Public Perception 
The contention that this measure would
align public perception with reality
— giving the mayor the authority
over all city functions that the public
already assumes he has — is also
unpersuasive. If most people think the
city runs the zoo, or that the city owns
the bridges that span the Willamette
River, should ownership of Metro's
zoo and Multnomah County’s bridges
be transferred to the city of Portland?
Citizens frequently call the mayor’s
office seeking solutions and are directed
to the commissioner in charge of the
relevant bureau. Your committee did
not find any evidence to suggest that
Portland residents do not understand
that different people might be in charge
of different bureaus, nor did we find
evidence that residents face significant
barriers to learning that commissioners
are in charge of bureaus assigned by
the mayor. In fact, your committee
found that citizens generally believe
the commissioners and city bureaus are
accessible. The 2006 report, Common
Themes & Comments from Portland’s
Neighborhood Leaders — an outcome
of an all-day meeting attended by
representatives of over 80 neighborhood
associations as well as members of
the charter review commission — also
concluded Portland’s government is
accessible.
Public Participation & Accountability
Despite both proponents and opponents
of the measure claiming that their
favored form of government maximizes
public participation, your committee
is persuaded that the proposed form
of government threatens the current
high levels of civic engagement,
government responsiveness, and citizen
access to government. Instead of five
commissioners who can respond to
constituent requests and complaints like
mayors, the proposed form would likely
compromise the mayor’s ability to hear
citizens and take action because of the
increased breadth of the job and the
buffering effect of an unelected chief
administrative officer and his or her staff.
From a citizen perspective, access to
decision-makers and city responsiveness
would likely be reduced. Your committee
found that the commission form is
likely to be more accessible than the
single-point of contact proposed by the
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measure suggested by the proposed
form. In fact, your committee heard
constituents complain that their access to
the mayor’s office was diminished when
Mayor Potter took all of the bureaus into
his portfolio early in his tenure.
Moreover, under the current form,
accountability to the public ultimately
rests with the elected official in charge of
a bureau. Because bureaus are assigned
to commissioners, the commissioner is
both the administrator in charge (with
the aid of professional bureau directors)
and the elected official who is ultimately
accountable. As a result, voters can hold
commissioners responsible for the poor
performance of particular bureaus at
election time. Under the proposed form
of government, the mayor would become
responsible for all of the bureaus,
necessarily lessening Council’s collective
knowledge about the specifics of bureau
services and, therefore, able to defer its
accountability for problems.
Your committee is convinced that
Portland’s many successes are in part the
result of the character and involvement
of its citizens. Their insistence on a
participatory and open government is
instrumental and will be the foundation
of the city’s health regardless of the
form of government. Nonetheless, we
are convinced that the current form
of government fosters broad public
debate and harnesses the civic energy
of Portlanders in a way that would be
diminished by the proposed change.
“
Nonetheless, we are convinced
that the current form of
government fosters broad public
debate and harnesses the civic
energy of Portlanders in a way




One point on which witnesses broadly
agree is that good government depends
far more on the talent, vision and
abilities of the participants than it does
on the form of government. Portland’s
history validates this. Your committee
believes that, over the past 35 years,
City Council has attracted many strong,
visionary leaders who have been able to
implement significant projects through
their work as commissioners in charge.
A significant factor contributing to
Portland’s success is its ability to attract
and retain talented and visionary leaders.
Your committee is convinced that
there is a direct relationship between
entrepreneurial leadership and the
commission form of government. Your
committee learned from present and past
commissioners and other witnesses that
strong leaders are attracted to Council
— in part — because of the opportunity
that commissioners have to effect real
change in the city.
Your committee is concerned that if
Measure 26-91 were to pass, the reduced
role of city commissioners would not
PP
rtlandCity Club of Po22
attract the kind of talent Portland needs.
The potential for strong leadership
on City Council is one of the primary
benefits of the commission form of
government worth preserving.
Professional Staff and Employees
Some witnesses suggested that Measure
26-91 would better enable Portland
to recruit high-level professional
management for the bureaus if those
professionals reported to a unified
executive, insulating them from the
day-to-day politics of the current form.
Nonetheless, past and present city
employees testified that Portland now
attracts, and the city has hired, some
of the most talented and committed
individuals in the country to run and
operate its bureaus. Your committee is
not persuaded either way whether the
current or proposed form of government
is more conducive to recruiting and
retaining the best professional staff.
Beyond questions of recruitment, some
proponents of the measure argue that
the involvement of politicians with
day-to-day operations of the bureaus
politicizes basic administrative decisions
and that commissioners can, and do,
micromanage employees within a
bureau.
Your committee found it hard to
believe that Measure 26-91 would
substantially change the relationship
between government employees and
elected officials. Under the present
form of government, commissioners are
responsible for their own bureaus and
are held accountable for the actions of
their own bureaus. Employees of those
bureaus are ultimately responsible to the
commissioner in charge of their bureau.
Commissioners have a vested interest
in making sure that their bureaus follow
legislative policies and directives.
By comparison, Multnomah County
operates under a form of government
very similar to the one proposed
in Measure 26-91. Your committee
heard testimony that, even though
county commissioners are not
directly responsible for executive or
administrative decisions, conflicting
demands from those county
commissioners creates a difficult work
environment for county employees.
Even if one did believe that insulating
bureaus from politics is a good idea,
your committee sees the county's
experience as evidence that the changes
in Measure 26-91 would not necessarily
insulate bureau employees from political
influence.
With regard to city employees’ efficiency
under the proposed form of government,
your committee accepts the likelihood
that employees could do their jobs more
efficiently if they no longer had to answer
to elected officials. But your committee
concludes that city employees will have
scrutiny from elected officials under
any form of government and that city
employees — like elected officials
— are accountable to the citizens of the
city they serve. In addition, given the
bureaucracy that would likely develop
under a purely legislative commission
— a group of legislative staff whose
job would be engaging in oversight
of bureaus — no form of government




Your committee believes the charter
review commission conducted its
study and deliberations with great
effort and passion for the success of
the city. The commission engaged
in a lengthy and inclusive process
and its membership voted for the
recommendations embodied in the
measure. However, your committee did
not find the commission’s report to
be compelling: it failed to discuss the
commission’s evaluation of evidence; it
did not create a connection between
its research and its recommendations;
and hence, its recommendations do not
provide Portland voters a useful analytic
framework for considering the merits of
the measure.
The charter review commission’s report
on the form of city government does not
make a case for the changes it proposes.
While your committee does not consider
the shortcomings of the report alone
enough to recommend a “No” vote on
Measure 26-91, we have weighed it as a
factor in our analysis.
Moreover, there are several weaknesses
in the language of the amendment itself.
First, the proposed charter does not
create a tight structure for creating and
implementing a citywide strategic plan.
Council is not required to execute its
new planning responsibility on a regular,
ongoing basis; and most importantly,
budget preparation, approval, and review
are not tied to the strategic plan.
Second, there is no transition plan, nor an
estimate of transition costs or additional
costs the proposed form would generate.
Third, the meaning of several of the
proposed changes is still the subject
of dispute between people who have
read the measure closely. For example,
the provisions governing how to fill
vacancies and the authority to fire staff
in the city auditor’s office remain unclear.
More importantly, the mayor’s authority
to sell property without Council's
approval is unclear and is the subject of
contentious debate between proponents
and opponents. Even proponents of
Measure 26-91 concede that Council
would have to pass ordinances to
establish procedures that would
constrain the authority granted to the
mayor to dispose of public property.
Finally, the proposed role of council
members is not sufficiently articulated
in the measure. Your committee
encountered wide disagreement about
the time commitment that would be
required to perform the legislative
function and about whether council
seats would continue to be full-time
positions under the proposed form. It is
also unclear to your committee whether
commissioners would retain their present
salaries and staff levels. Proponents could
not clearly articulate exactly what Council
would do beyond saying that council
members would provide oversight of
the bureaus (by holding hearings and
forming committees), legislate, approve
the budget and advocate for citizens.
Without better definition of Council’s
tasks, there is a risk that Council would
become significantly weaker or an
adversarial impediment to the mayor and
the chief administrative officer.
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PAST CITY CLUB REPORTS
Your committee gave substantial weight
to past positions taken by the Club on
the same or related issues. Over the past
half-century, several City Club study
committees concluded the current form
of city government is inadequate, and
all of those committees recommended
a change from the present commission
form of government. We have reviewed
those reports and realize that we are the
first study committee to depart from the
established City Club study committee
precedent — including the most recent
City Club report of 2002 in favor of the
change that was not adopted by City
Club members. We, like previous study
committees, agree that city government
must improve, but we depart from the
trend of endorsing a different form of
government.
It is worth noting that the 1961 and
1966 City Club reports focused on the
same type of momentous demographic
shifts and future growth that the charter
review commission’s recommendation
is based upon. Yet the test of time has
not borne out the calamities predicted
in these reports; rather, the last 40 years
show Portland has been remarkably
successful compared to many cities in
managing change and growth.
“
 we, like previous study
committees, agree that city
government must improve, but
we depart from the trend of
endorsing a different form of
government. PP
Despite the Club’s analysis of earlier
proposals, your committee unanimously
believes that proponents of change in
the form of government have not made a
strong case that Portland’s present form
is unable to produce good results, or
that the proposed form will. In addition,
we have identified significant potential
drawbacks in the proposed form of
government. Your committee is not
convinced that Measure 26-91 offers the
best solution, nor are we comfortable
with the associated risks.
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CONCLUSIONS
Your committee concludes that Portland’s government has ample room to improve;
the same surely could be said of any government or any other organization
— public, private or nonprofit. Yet, we are unpersuaded that Measure 26-91 offers
a net improvement to the governance of Portland. The main challenges under the
present form of government are (1) effective cross-bureau coordination, especially in
formulating and implementing the city’s budget, vision and long-range plans; and (2)
efficient use of resources to deliver city services. Your committee concludes that these
challenges can be met and overcome under the current form and that Portlanders
should not accept the negative tradeoffs inherent in the proposed change.
The present form of government creates innovation and flexibility. Your
committee concludes that some measure of Portland’s success and character is due to
the dynamic exchange among commissioners, and between commissioners and the
public, that occurs under our commission form of government. Council’s ability to take
advantage of opportunities that cannot be foreseen by planning is key to innovation.
These attributes are valuable, and must be preserved. Also worth preserving is the
proven flexibility and resiliency of the current form, where strong commissioners with
a detailed working knowledge of bureaus can maneuver through the bureaucratic
structures, serve as knowledgeable and effective access points for concerned
constituents, and protect against weak or reckless mayoral leadership.
The proposed form of government creates a danger of diminished leadership,
innovation and flexibility. As we see it, any proposed change to the form of
government must retain or improve upon what works well. Bureau-level innovation,
creativity and citizen involvement, which are this city’s hallmarks, are at risk if the
present form of government is replaced. Your committee also believes that strong and
innovative leaders are less likely to seek positions on City Council if Measure 26-91 is
approved by voters.
While the city needs to strategically plan its future, the present form of
government allows that to happen, without incurring the risks of the proposed
form. There is no question that there is significant work to be done by Council.
Portland will face important and difficult issues in the coming decades, such as
changing demographics, aging infrastructure and strained resources. Those are not
categorically different than the challenges that have arisen over the past several
decades — decades that saw our present form of government adapt and respond
to those challenges. We emphasize that the city cannot coast — the mayor and all
commissioners must turn immediately, and collaboratively, to effective long-range
planning and to increasing fiscal and operational efficiency.






the present form to
address present and
future problems. While
the present form of
government is not an
impediment to creating a
strategic plan, it may pose
a potential roadblock to its
implementation. Indeed,
all commissioners must
collaborate with the mayor
The potential for poor
communication among
bureaus in supporting and
implementing a citywide
plan exposes one of the
potential weaknesses of
the commission form of
to implement a long-range,
strategic plan. That implementation must
include coordinated efforts between
commissioners and their assigned
bureaus. It must include specific plans for
each of the city’s bureaus that support
and implement the citywide strategic
plan, not a series of separate plans that
treat bureaus as isolated outposts.
The potential for poor communication
among bureaus in supporting and
implementing a citywide plan exposes
one of the potential weaknesses of the
commission form of government. Your
committee believes that kind of poor
communication could also exist under
the proposed form of government. More
importantly, previous administrations
have illustrated that, when the various
bureaus act in concert under strong
Council leadership, the commission form
of government can be a powerful asset
in a cohesive city government. With past
experience to guide our thinking about
what could occur in the future, Portland
has clear evidence that the present
form of government is capable of both
meeting existing needs, and generating
and implementing creative and forward-
thinking ideas.
Voters should reject Measure 26-91.
With such a rejection, the question will
become: within the commission form of
government, will the city's elected officials
improve systems to promote coordination
and collaboration among bureaus and
lead the city in implementing an effective
strategic plan while maintaining innovation
and flexibility? Your committee concludes
that they can, and as concerned citizens,
we insist that they must.
Devising systems to ensure collaborative
planning and implementation
among bureaus is possible if the
mayor, exercising leadership, and the
commissioners and city auditor, as
engaged participants, make collaboration
a priority. If they fail to do so, the citizens
of Portland must hold them accountable,
by replacing them. If compelling evidence
develops that the failure to accomplish
those goals is due to Portland’s form of
government, then the citizens of Portland
should re-open this conversation. At
the present time, no such compelling
evidence exists, and the risks of adopting
Measure 26-91 outweigh any of the
arguments in favor of the change.
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Charter Review Commission, Form of Government Subcommittee. “Summary Minutes
of Interview with Charles Jordan, Former Portland Commissioner and Portland Parks
Bureau Director.” February 8, 2006.
Charter Review Commission, Form of Government Subcommittee. “Summary Minutes
of Interview with Dennis Buchanan, Former Executive Officer of Multnomah County.”
January 11, 2006.
Charter Review Commission, Vision PDX, and Community Connect. “Common Themes
& Comments from Portland’s Neighborhood Leaders.” September 16, 2006.
Auditor’s Office
Resolution No. 35789. “Maintaining the Planning Bureau and Increasing the
Responsibility of the Planning Director.” May 12, 1999.
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Measure 26-91 Exhibit B as Amended: “Ballot Title Language.” Undated.
Details on Exhibit B Amendment. Undated.
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Bureau of Planning
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Mayor’s Office
“Report on the Bureau Innovation Project.” May 2005. Rev. July 29, 2005.
River Renaissance Initiative, River Renaissance Directors. “2005-2006 State of the River
Report.” January 19, 2006.
City Club of Portland
“Portland City Government,” Bulletin (Vol. 41, No. 51), May 19, 1961.
“Charter Revision for City of Portland,” Bulletin (Vol. 44, No. 5), July 5, 1963.
“Changing Form of City Government,” Bulletin (Vol. 46. No. 50), May 13, 1966.
“Partial Charter Revision,” Bulletin (Vol. 47, No. 22), October 28, 1966.
“Increasing Density in Portland,” (Vol. 81, No. 24), November 5, 1999.
“Ballot Measure 26-30: Changes to the City of Portland’s Form of Government,” Bulletin
(Vol. 83, No. 49), May 3, 2002.
Friday Forum. Portland Mayor Tom Potter, “State of the City,” January 19, 2007.
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1 National League of Cities.
2 City Club Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 5.
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APPENDIX A: COMMON TYPES OF CITY GOVERNMENT
City Manager-City Council
Under this form of government, a city council hires a professional city manager who
reports directly to the council. Although the council retains both legislative and
administrative powers, it delegates the day-to-day administrative functions to the
city manager. Thus, the city manager serves as the professional executive in charge of
municipal affairs but reports to and is subject to dismissal by the council. In this form
of government the mayor may be elected by the city at large or by the council. The
mayor’s responsibilities are largely ceremonial with no appointive or administrative
power.
Mayor-City Council
Under the mayor-council form, a mayor is elected at large and is the chief executive
officer. The mayor has the power to appoint and remove department heads and is
responsible for the preparation of the budget for council consideration. Some cities
using a mayor-city council form grant veto power over council decisions and are
classified as strong mayor systems. The mayor is also the chief executive officer for
the city. A number of cities with this form of government have a chief administrative
officer who has professional training and experience similar to that of a city manager.
The administrative officer is appointed by and is directly responsible to the mayor for
managing daily administrative functions. Legislative functions are vested in the city
council. This structure separates administrative responsibilities from legislative policy
making.
Commission
The commission form of government combines legislative and administrative
responsibilities in a group of elected commissioners (commonly three, five or
seven). The mayor is a member of the commission and may be elected separately
or chosen from the group of elected commissioners. The mayor may have unique
powers and responsibilities, but generally is equal in power to other commissioners.
Commissioners commonly have both legislative and executive responsibilities. The
commission makes city policy, enacts city ordinances and appropriates city funds.
Individual commissioners administer city bureaus.
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APPENDIX B: CITY OF PORTLAND
DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES




• Bureau of Environmental Services • Bureau of Planning
• Office of Transportation • Bureau of Police
• Office of Neighborhood
Involvement
Commissioner of Public Safety • Office of Emergency Management
Randy Leonard • Government Relations
• City Attorney
• Bureau of Water Works • Office of Management & Finance
• Bureau of Hydroelectric Power • Portland Development Commission
• Bureau of Emergency • Bureau of Licenses
Communications
• Bureau of Development Services
Commissioner of Public Affairs
City Auditor
Gary Blackmer
Dan Saltzman • Assessments & Liens
• Audit Services
• Bureau of Parks & Recreation • City Recorder
• Office of Sustainable Development • Fire & Police Disability & Retirement
• Office of Cable Communications • Hearings Office
• Children’s Investment Fund • Independent Police Review
• Management Services
• Ombudsman
Commissioner of Public works • Progress Board
Erik Sten
• Bureau of Fire, Rescue and
Emergency Services
• Bureau of Housing & Community
Development
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APPENDIX C: CITY CODE RELATED TO CURRENT CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
3.15.010 Organization.
The Office of Management and Finance shall be under the direction and control of
the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). The CAO shall be responsible for the overall
coordination and management of the bureaus of the Office of Management and
Finance to assure that the goals of the City Council are met and the mission and goals
of the Office of Management and Finance are achieved. This includes responsibility
for the productivity, responsiveness and effectiveness of the services and programs of
the Office of Management and Finance. The Office of Management and Finance also
shall be charged with providing ongoing evaluation and proposing improvements
to city administrative service functions in all city bureaus. Day-to-day supervision of
administrative service functions outside the Office of Management and Finance will
remain with bureau managers. The CAO will consult with bureau managers and labor
unions in fulfilling his or her duties.
3.15.030 Office of the Chief Administrative Officer.
A. The Office of the Chief Administrative Officer, City of Portland shall be supervised
by the CAO and shall include such other employees as the Council may provide.
The Office of Chief Administrative Officer shall be responsible for the overall
coordination of the administrative service functions of the City.
B. In conjunction with the annual budget, the CAO shall provide the City Council a
detailed annual workplan to improve city administrative services
C. The CAO will meet with the City Council at least twice a year to report on efforts
to continually evaluate and improve all city administrative services, including
those contained in the annual workplan.
D. The CAO or designee shall perform the duties of the position referred to in the
Oregon Revised Statutes as Budget Officer.
E. The CAO may determine that the City’s administrative services are more
effectively and efficiently provided by another configuration or organization
of bureaus and may recommend such reconfiguration or reorganization to the
City Council.
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F. Upon approval of the City Council, the CAO or designee shall have the specific
authority to:
1. I mplement policies, practices, rules, regulations and systems for providing
all city administrative services. All bureaus and agencies shall comply with
City Council approved policies, practices, rules, regulations and systems
established for administrative services.
2. Determine if any administrative service should be provided by city staff or
outside vendors. Bureaus shall use the services of the Office of Management
and Finance unless otherwise authorized by the CAO or directed by the City
Council.
3. Provide administrative services to any other governmental or private agency
when it is in the interest of the City to do so.
4. Provide additional administrative services as directed by the Council.
5. Recommend to Council organizational structures for providing administrative
services citywide.
Measure 26-92 is one of four ballot measures that resulted from the work of a charter
review commission authorized by City Council and appointed by Mayor Tom Potter in
November 2005. The charter review commission made recommendations to amend
the city charter as it relates to the Portland Development Commission. Most of those
recommendations were addressed in Measure 26-92; however, City Council made several
important amendments when referring the measure to the May 2007 ballot. One of those
changes was significant enough for your committee to recommend a “no” vote on this
measure.
Measure 26-92 proposes that “City Council shall be the budget committee for the
Commission.” Your committee believes strongly that this change would give City Council
too much control over the decisions now made by PDC and would effectively end the
agency’s quasi-independent status. The charter review commission did not recommend
that City Council be the budget committee for PDC, and according to the commission’s
chair, now that City Council has included this provision in the ballot measure, the idea
still has little to no support among members of the charter review commission. In fact,
the commission concluded that PDC would best serve the city of Portland by remaining a
quasi-independent entity.
Your committee asserts that PDC’s relative independence from City Hall is its greatest
asset. While a 2005 City Club report called for changes in PDC’s relationship with City
Hall and the planning bureau, as well as a better system for collecting and using input
from citizens, your committee believes Measure 26-92 would be a significant step in the
wrong direction. The same 2005 report by City Club also found that the very structure of
PDC, which is one step removed from the political pressure inherent with elected office, is
critical to the effectiveness of the agency.
Your committee found insufficient justification to increase City Council’s direct authority
over PDC as called for by Measure 26-92 and its supporters. For the reasons stated above
and more thoroughly outlined in the body of this report, your committee unanimously
opposes Measure 26-92.
City of Portland Measure 26-92
AMENDS CHARTER: DEFiNES MiSSioN, iNCREASES ovERSiGHT oF
PoRTLAND DEvELoPMENT CoMMiSSioN
Published in the City Club of Portland Bulletin
Vol. 89, No. 16, Friday, April 20, 2007
A City Club Report on Ballot Measure 26-92
City Club members will vote on this report on Friday, April 20, 2007. Until the membership
vote takes place, City Club of Portland does not have an official position on this report.
The outcome of this vote will be reported in the City Club Bulletin dated May 4, 2007 and
online at www.pdxcityclub.org .
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iNTRoDUCTioN
Ballot Measure 26-92 will appear on the ballot as follows:
Caption: Amends Charter: Defines mission, increases oversight of Portland
Development Commission.
Question: Shall the Portland Development Commission budget be subject to City
Council oversight with financial and performance audits by City Auditor?
Summary: Under the current Charter, the Portland Development Commission (PDC)
is the City’s urban renewal agency. This measure directs PDC to implement the City’s
urban renewal, affordable housing and economic development vision and goals. If
authorized by state law, the Council will be the budget committee for the Commission.
The Commission budget will be required to incorporate City goals and will be
submitted to the Council in conjunction and conformity with the City budget process.
The measure provides that the Commission shall advance social equity, involve
the constituencies of the City, and promote home ownership and the creation and
retention of multi-family housing.
The measure authorizes the Mayor to appoint and remove PDC Commissioners, with
approval of the City Council. The measure provides that the Commission shall be
subject to financial and performance audits by the City Auditor. The measure requires
that the annual Commission report to Council include an evaluation of Commission
activities with respect to City adopted vision and goals. The measure would be
effective July 1, 2007.
(The caption, question, and summary were prepared by the city attorney.)
City Council referred Ballot Measure 26-92 to the May 2007 ballot by a vote of 3-2.
If approved, Measure 26-92 would amend the city charter to restate the general
powers and duties of the Portland Development Commission and increase City
Hall’s oversight of PDC.
PDC, the city’s urban renewal agency, was established in 1958 by a narrow
majority of the popular vote. It is administered, not as another city agency or
directly by the City Council, but by a five-member commission appointed by the
mayor with approval of Council. While the commission has more autonomy than
any city agency, City Council approval is required for the creation, expansion or
extension of urban renewal areas, authorization to sell bonds, and final budget
adoption.
City Club convened a committee of seven Club members to analyze Measure
26-92 and issue a voting recommendation. Your committee was charged with
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determining whether the measure would be consistent with positions adopted
by City Club. Most members of your committee also served on the committee
that published City Club’s most recent body of research on PDC. Other committee
members were screened to ensure that no member had an economic interest in the
outcome of the study or had taken a public position on the subject of the measure.
City Club’s study of Measure 26-92 was conducted between February 7 and March 19,
2007. Your committee interviewed proponents and opponents of the measure and
other interested individuals and considered relevant written material.
BACKGRoUND
In March 2003, City Club undertook a study of PDC’s governance structure and
processes. That study, completed and adopted in January 2005, made the following
four recommendations regarding the relationship between Portland’s City Council
and city auditor and PDC:
a. City Council should exercise stronger legislative oversight of PDC activities;
b. The city auditor should periodically conduct a performance audit of PDC;
c. City Council should clearly state how the city is to be involved in regional
economic development and what role PDC should play;
d. Structures and procedures to ensure effective coordination between the
Bureau of Planning and PDC must be established and thereafter continuously
monitored by City Council.
The study concluded that PDC’s relative independence was an essential asset of the
organization and recommended that PDC’s functions not be incorporated into a city
bureau or department. Since publication of City Club’s report in 2005, PDC’s executive
director was replaced, and all five seats on the commission turned over and were
filled with new appointments made by Mayor Tom Potter. Additionally, in the most
recent budgeting process, city commissioners and PDC commissioners worked jointly
on PDC’s proposed budget.
1
In November 2005, City Council established a charter review commission to review
and recommend changes to Portland’s city charter. Mayor Potter appointed each
member of the 26-person commission. Upon completion of its work, the commission
recommended changes in four areas. One set of proposals, which will appear on
the ballot as Measure 26-92, addresses the Portland Development Commission.
The substance of the ballot measure includes some of the recommendations of the
charter review commission. Other proposed changes were inserted by City Council,
one of which is critical to your committee’s recommendation.
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If enacted, Measure 26-92 would make the following changes:
a. City Council would become the budget committee for PDC;
b. The mayor, with approval of City Council, would have the authority to
remove members of the Portland Development Commission;
c. Annual financial audits and periodic performance audits of PDC would be
required;
d. PDC would be directed to implement the vision and goals of the city as
adopted by City Council relating to urban renewal, economic development
and affordable housing.
Other elements of Measure 26-92 are not germane to your committee’s analysis.
ARGUMENTS PRo AND CoN
SUMMARy ARGUMENT ADvANCED iN FAvoR oF THE MEASURE
Proponents of Measure 26-92 argue that greater oversight and budget control are
necessary in order to ensure that PDC function in the best interest of all citizens
of Portland. They suggest that only through direct control of the budget will PDC
undertake the type of projects favored by most of the Portland’s citizens, and
that only through the auditing and reporting requirements can accountability be
guaranteed.
SUMMARy ARGUMENT ADvANCED AGAiNST THE MEASURE
Opponents of Measure 26-92 submit that the wording of the measure — “City
Council shall be the budget committee for the Commission” — is tantamount to
complete control, thereby undermining or eliminating PDC’s independence. It is
that independence that allows PDC to act in a business-like manner, to remain
“nimble” and to operate without overt political pressure. Opponents of the measure
believe that the current structure allows PDC to conduct sound investment-minded
development rather than politically expedient development.
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in fact, the ch
DiSCUSSioN & ANALySiS
Your committee focused most of its
attention on the three functional
elements of the ballot measure examined
below. In addition, your committee
discusses its concerns about the official
caption, question and summary of the
ballot measure.
ESTABLiSHiNG PDC’S BUDGET
Section 15-105 of the proposed charter
revision says “City Council shall be the
budget committee for the [PDC].” As
explained below, that phrase and its
implications drive your committee’s
unanimous recommendation to oppose
this ballot measure.
The charter review commission correctly
concluded that state law prohibits
City Council from being the “budget
committee” for PDC. Commissioner
Randy Leonard told your committee
that should a change in state law be
necessary, the city would seek that
change in the Legislature. Since your
committee met with Commissioner
Leonard, City Council decided to pursue
changing state law to allow City Council
to be the “governing body of [PDC]...
irrespective of whether the city has
appointed a board or commission....”
2
The charter review commission did
not recommend this change in the
budgeting process. City commissioners
added the provision after the charter
review commission submitted its report.
According to David Wang, chair of
the charter review commission, there
was virtually no support among the




that PDC remain a quasi-
independent a
status that your committee
believes would cease
to exist if City Council
assumes compl
over PDC’s budget.
a sweeping change. In fact, the charter
review commission’s report specifically
recommended that PDC remain a quasi-
independent agency — a status that your
committee believes would cease to exist
if City Council were to assume complete
control over PDC’s budget.
Your committee has observed
improvements in PDC’s budgeting
process. PDC has altered its budget cycle
to correspond with the city’s schedule,
and in the most recent budget cycle,
two city commissioners and two PDC
commissioners worked jointly to review
and adjust PDC’s proposed budget.
The changes made to the budget
totaled about $500,000 out of a $200
million budget — a mere one quarter
of one percent — as close to complete
agreement as arithmetic and politics will
ever produce.
After 22 months of study and
deliberation, a City Club committee
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City Hall allows it to make
good judgments based on
the financial merits of the
proposals rather than on
the political calculus of the
moment.'
serves the city and its citizens as a
semi-autonomous agency. While that
report found areas within PDC to
criticize, the report stopped well short of
recommending that the agency operate
under a budget written and controlled by
City Council.
Voters should be mindful that in 1958,
PDC was created with a board of
commissioners purposely distinct from
City Council. This degree of political
insulation was considered critical. Many
witnesses interviewed by City Club’s
2005 study committee agreed. According
to the 2005 report, both developers
and elected officials insisted that “PDC’s
separation from City Hall allows it to
make good judgments based on the
financial merits of the proposals rather
than on the political calculus of the
moment.”
3
 Similar sentiments were also
heard during the study of this ballot
measure.
It also bears repeating that City Council
already has substantial power over PDC
and its decisions. Council approves the
appointment of PDC commissioners; it
approves the establishment of urban
renewal areas, their expansion and
extension; and it must authorize the
sale of bonds — the lifeblood of PDC’s
activities. Measure 26-92 would invert
the budgeting process that is now in
place. The starting point would become
City Council rather than PDC. City Council
would write the budget, and in doing
so, Council would decide which projects
would be funded. PDC would then be left
to implement the budget written by City
Council.
By contrast, the process now begins
with PDC staff, urban renewal advisory
committees and PDC commissioners
preparing a budget based on their
assessment of the city’s development
priorities and the resources available. As
the final step under the current system,
City Council must review and approve
the budget submitted by PDC before
it can be adopted. Your committee
believes the proposed new budgetary
power would serve only to compel PDC
to do those individual projects that
can muster at least three votes on City
Council. Likewise, projects thought to
be important by PDC, but opposed by
at least three members of City Council,
would not go forward. This change
would undermine the current system of
checks and balances that makes it more
difficult for Council members to force or
block projects for political reasons.
REMovAL oF PDC CoMMiSSioNERS
Another change proposed by City
Council, and not supported by the
charter review commission, would
give the mayor additional power to
remove PDC commissioners from




charter, “[a] vacancy shall occur from
the death, resignation or inability to
serve of any member, or failure without
cause to attend three (3) successive
regular meetings.” The charter review
commission recommended that City
Council be vested with the power to
remove PDC commissioners “for cause.”
City Council thought otherwise and
proposed an “at will” standard. If Measure
26-92 passes, “[PDC commissioners]...
may be removed by the mayor, subject to
approval by City Council.”
“At will” means that no reason need
be given for dismissal. Removal “for
cause,” at the least, would require the
mayor or Council to articulate a reason
for removing a PDC commissioner from
office. Measure 26-92 does not specify
the scope of acceptable reasons for
removing a commissioner or options
for recourse. When coupled with
other provisions of the measure, your
committee believes this change would
give the mayor too much control over
decision-making at PDC, increase the
influence of politics in PDC’s operations
and deter PDC commissioners from
taking positions contrary to the mayor.
ELEMENTS oF MEASURE 26-92
CoNSiSTENT wiTH CiTy CLUB’S
2005 STUDy oF PDC
Assuming City Council articulates a vision
and a set of goals for urban renewal,
economic development and affordable
housing, requiring PDC to implement
them would be consistent with City
Club’s 2005 recommendation for
increased coordination between PDC and
City Hall. Measure 26-92 calls for the city
auditor to conduct performance audits
of PDC. This, too, would be consistent
with a recommendation made by City
Club in 2005. The measure would further
require an annual report to City Council
that evaluates the activities of PDC. While
such a report would risk duplicating
information already provided in a
performance audit and would require
additional resources, your committee
believes this requirement may also have
the benefit of improved communication
and coordination between PDC and City
Hall.
BALLoT CAPTioN, QUESTioN AND SUMMARy
In addition to the substantive concerns
identified above, your committee
is also concerned about how this
measure is being presented to voters.
The measure’s caption, question and
summary are misleading. The caption
simply claims that the measure “defines
mission, [and] increases oversight of
the [PDC].” Your committee believes
strongly that “increases oversight”
significantly understates the potential
— and probably intended — outcome
of the measure. That is, your committee
believes Measure 26-92 would impose
City Council’s direct control over PDC.
In addition, “Should City Council set
the budget for PDC?” would have
been a more accurate question than to
suggest a simple increase in oversight.
Your committee further objects to the
measure’s summary, which is where the
phrase “City Council shall be the budget
committee for Commission” can be
found. Such obscure wording may have
clear meaning to those with knowledge
of government finance, but certainly not
to the general voting public.
“Simply stated, budget
control is complete control.
we continue to believe
as we did in 2005, that




when the agency was
established. PP
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CoNCLUSioNS
In 2005, City Club recommended greater
oversight and involvement by City
Council in the agency’s operation and
greater access by the public into PDC’s
decision-making processes. In producing
this report, your committee relied heavily
on City Club’s 2005 study of PDC — its
22 months of work, over 70 interviews,
thousands of pages of background
material and documents, and count-
less hours of analysis and deliberation.
A key conclusion of that report was that
PDC should remain a quasi-independent
agency. Your committee believes that
Measure 26-92 would effectively end that
independence. Simply stated, budget
control is complete control. We continue
to believe as we did in 2005, that PDC’s
greatest asset is the structural insulation
from day-to-day politics that was pur-
posely designed when the agency was
established. We find no justification for
the result of this ballot measure should
it pass — to tie the hands of the five PDC
commissioners and effectively end the
agency’s quasi-independent status.
Your committee further concludes that
removal “for cause” is the appropriate
standard for prematurely ending the
service of an appointed commissioner.
Lastly, your committee believes that the
ballot caption, question and summary
are extraordinarily misleading.
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Readers are encouraged to read and consider City
Club’s 2005 research report titled




and by calling 503 228-7231 ext. 101.
RECoMMENDATioN









Wade Fickler, policy director
rtlandCity Club of Po10
wiTNESSES
In addition to the persons listed below, your committee sought interviews with two
other city commissioners and another representative of PDC. For various reasons they
were unavailable or declined to respond.
Douglas Blomgren, former PDC Commissioner
Chip Lazenby, former legal counsel, Portland Development Commission
Randy Leonard, City Commissioner, City of Portland
Mark Rosenbaum, Chair, Portland Development Commission
David Wang, Chair, Charter Review Commission
Your committee also considered the remarks of City Commissioner Erik Sten and PDC
Chair Mark Rosenbaum at the City Club Friday Forum on March 2, 2007 where the
merits of the proposed ballot measure were debated.
RESoURCE MATERiALS
Charter Review Commission Report to City Council, “A City Government for Portland’s
Future,” January 18, 2007.
City Club of Portland, “Portland Development Commission: Governance, Structure and
Process," January 21, 2005.
CiTATioNS
1  February 23, 2007, The Oregonian, “In Portland”, page 3 and remarks by Mark
Rosenbaum at City Club’s Friday Forum on March 2, 2007.
2 2007 legislative agenda approved by City Council.
3 2005 City Club report on the Portland Development Commission, page 28.
